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Attempts to describe aesthetic artefacts through 
informational models have existed at least since the 
late 1950s; but they have not been as successful as 
their proponents expected nor are they popular 
among art scholars because of their (mostly) 
quantitative nature. However, given how information 
technology has deeply shifted every aspect of our 
world, it is fair to ask whether aesthetic value 
continues to be immune to informational 
interpretations. This paper discusses the ideas of the 
late Russian biophysicist, Mikhail Volkenstein 
concerning art and aesthetic value. It contrasts them 
with Max Bense’s ‘information aesthetics’, and with 
contemporary philosophical understandings of 
information. Overall, this paper shows that an 
informational but not necessarily quantitative 
approach serves not only as an effective means to 
describe our interaction with artworks, but also 
contributes to explain why purely quantitative models 
struggle to formalise aesthetic value. Finally, it makes 
the case that adopting an informational outlook helps 
overcome the ‘analogue vs digital’ dichotomy by 
arguing the distinction is epistemological rather than 
ontological, and therefore the two notions need not be 
incompatible. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) have led to 
profound socio-cultural changes and paradigm shifts. 
The ‘information cycle’ (Floridi, 2010) has become the 
engine of post-industrial societies and information 
itself has turned into a powerful hermeneutical device 
employed by many scientific fields to comprehend 
and explain a myriad of phenomena. Even the 
humanities, a field historically wary of ‘technoscience’, 
have come to embrace ICTs and informational 
approaches through so-called ‘digital humanities’ 
institutes and programs. Creative practitioners now 
regularly use computational tools and methods and, in 
the process, are expanding the limits and 
transforming the ‘languages’ of aesthetic practices, as 
well as our wider understanding of art and human-
technology relations. Nonetheless, and although 
computational technology is quintessentially 
informational, information-centric analyses of art 
continue to be rare. Arguably, this has to do with the 
fact that information is still regarded by scholars in the 
arts and the humanities as a purely quantitative 
notion. Hence, it is associated with formalisation, and 
systematisation; modes of thinking that are seen as 
threats to art’s strongest features: its intuitive nature 
and its openness to interpretation. 
The most well-known attempt to analyse aesthetic 
value through an informational lens was Max Bense 
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and Abraham Moles’s ’informational aesthetics’. 
Developed in the late 1950s, this was a 
multidisciplinary approach that mixed George D. 
Birkhoff’s (1933) ‘aesthetic measure’, based on the 
ratio between order and complexity, Claude E. 
Shannon’s (1948) Mathematical Theory of 
Communication, Norbert Wiener’s (1985) Cybernetics 
and Peircean semiotics (see Klütsch, 2012). The 
ultimate goal of information aesthetics was to develop 
a method for objectively measuring aesthetic value, 
thus freeing aesthetic judgements from ‘subjective 
speculation’ (Klütsch, 2012, p. 67). Understandably, 
and despite Modernism’s penchant for rationality (e.g. 
Clement Greenberg’s (1999) comparison between 
medium specificity and the scientific parcelling of 
natural phenomena), this type of engagement with 
artworks was not the most popular within art 
scholarship, even after computational technology 
became fully embraced by artists and other creative 
practitioners. Instead, most contemporary art scholars 
continue to outsource their theoretical frameworks 
and views on computer-generated aesthetic artefacts 
to media studies and other recent fields such as 
software studies. 
This paper discusses Mikhail Volkenstein’s (2009) 
characterisation of artworks as ‘integral informational 
systems’. It argues that this informational approach 
offers not only a rich insight to better understand how 
we relate and judge aesthetic artefacts, but also helps 
to clarify why attempts to quantify aesthetic value are 
very unlikely to succeed. The paper begins by 
introducing key aspects of information as understood 
by Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of 
Communication, as well as providing a brief 
description of information aesthetics’ main arguments. 
This is followed by a concise outline of Volkenstein’s 
ideas concerning artistic information and its value. The 
next section then introduces an alternative 
understanding of information, provided by the 
philosophy of information. The discussion begins by 
comparing Volkenstein’s views with information 
aesthetics, before showing why seeing the artwork as 
a system explains the failure of quantitative models to 
fully account for aesthetic value. Finally, the paper 
suggests that by being applicable to all forms of art, 
the informational system approach discussed above 
may help supersede the analogue vs digital 
dichotomy. This paper does not (cannot) deny that 
aesthetics, creativity and artistic pleasure might 
someday be analysed objectively; that is, it does not 
subscribe to any essentialist conception of art. It 
simply shows that trying to quantify what happens 
when we create art amounts to quantifying human 
cognitive abilities; a task which, at the very least, 
would, call for enormous datasets, computational 
power, and algorithmic design way beyond our 
current capabilities. 
2 | UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION 
The word information from the Latin term in formare, 
is a construction reportedly used by Cicero and Saint 
Augustine when discussing Plato’s Theory of Forms, 
and particularly by Cicero to refer to 
‘“representation[s] implanted in the mind”’ (cited in 
Adriaans & Van Benthem, 2008, p. 8). By the early 
Renaissance, the French word information came to be 
used interchangeably to refer to such things as 
‘”investigation,” “education,” “the act of informing or 
communicating knowledge,” and “intelligence”’ 
(Adriaans & Van Benthem, 2008, p. 8). However, by 
the end of the seventeenth century, the original 
technical sense of the word had disappeared, as 
British Empiricists who returned to Platonic sources 
chose instead to use the term ‘idea’ (Adriaans & Van 
Benthem, 2008), from ‘eidos’, the Greek word for 
Platonic Form (Dusek, 2006). It was only in the 
twentieth century that ‘information’ began to recover 
its technical connotation. Harry Nyquist and Ralph 
Hartley, both engineers working separately at Bell 
Laboratories, became interested in the possibility of 
quantifying the transmission of information or 
‘intelligence’ (Byfield, 2008). Their papers, published in 
1928, would serve as the basis for Shannon’s 1948 
landmark work, ‘A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication’ [1] (henceforth MTC), the first 
successful method for describing communication in 
terms of probability, and the stepping-stone for 
contemporary ‘information theory’ [2]. 
2.1 INFORMATION AS A QUANTITY 
Although usually described as such, MTC is not a 
theory of information. It is rather a statistical 
formalisation of data transmission. And while the 
theory does provide a definition of information (i.e. as 
a measure of the freedom of choice an agent has 
when selecting the contents of a message), it is so 
intentionally narrow as to be hardly useful outside the 
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theoretical framework in which it is embedded. 
Oversimplifying, Shannon’s theory is a general 
description of the circumstances governing every 
instance where ‘not-yet-meaningful’ data are 
transmitted (Floridi, 2016), and which are represented 
by computable and interchangeable binary digits, or 
‘bits’. The goal of MTC was not to provide an all-
encompassing account of information, but to 
determine (a) what the ultimate level of data 
compression was and (b) what the ultimate rate of 
data transmission was. In other words, how much 
could the size of a given message be reduced before 
making it unintelligible and how fast could it be 
transmitted. For MTC, ‘information’ does not refer to 
what is actually being said, but instead to what could 
be said (Weaver, 1949) using a given amount of data. 
Since MTC was conceived to analyse any instance of 
information exchange in quantitative terms, the model 
had to ignore all the unquantifiable ‘psychological’ 
(Byfield, 2008) aspects involved in communication. 
MTC intentionally disregards the semantic value of 
messages and treats information as a mere 
placeholder – in the same manner that a gram and a 
millimetre serve as placeholders – that is, as a ‘raw’ 
(Floridi, 2004, p. 51), ‘dimension-less’ (Ben-Naim, 
2008, p. 203) quantity. MTC is fundamentally a model 
of communication limits at the syntactic level, 
concerned exclusively with the transmission of 
information and not with information itself. This means 
MTC has little to say about reception (an aspect of 
communication which is of capital importance to, say, 
media theory). Moreover, MTC does not provide a 
method for measuring information per se but for 
quantifying the amount of ignorance or uncertainty 
erased by a message (Floridi, 2004). In other words, 
Shannon used the quantification of predictability and 
redundancy as a ‘backward way of measuring 
information content’ (Gleick, 2011b, p. 191). 
MTC regards communication as a system that is 
neither deterministic nor entirely random, but 
stochastic, meaning that its outputs are the product of 
certain probabilities (Gleick, 2011a, p. 187). Two fair 
dice are an example of a stochastic system since it is 
possible to calculate the probability of getting any 
number between two and twelve at any given throw; 
with seven being always the most probable outcome, 
and with each throw being subject to a certain 
amount of randomness, or ‘entropy’, and probability. 
Conversely two extremely biased dice represent a 
deterministic system, since after a series of throws 
one can be fairly certain of what number will come 
next. Deterministic systems are virtually devoid of 
randomness. Whereas in a totally random system (i.e. 
one that stands in a maximum state of entropy) the 
succession of events shows no discernible pattern on 
which to base future predictions, for there is simply no 
way to calculate the likelihood of any output. For 
MTC, the more unexpected the contents of a 
message the more informative the message is and 
vice versa, the more expected and redundant the less 
informative. Thus, in theory, the higher the 
randomness, the higher the (potential) amount of 
information. In summary, for MTC information 
represents a decrease in uncertainty or, more 
precisely, a reduction in ‘data deficit’ (Floridi, 2004, p. 
47) or ‘ignorance’ (Ben-Naim, 2008) about the state of 
a system or the contents of a message. MTC is a very 
effective model in contexts where semantic value is 
not a priority – e.g. in electronic communications and 
computation, but its suitability diminishes greatly in 
circumstances where meaning is central to the 
analysis, such as in aesthetic practices. 
2.2 INFORMATION AESTHETICS 
One of the most well-known attempts to apply MTC’s 
definition of information to the analysis of aesthetic 
artefacts was ‘Information Aesthetics’. This theory’s 
goal was to measure the amount and the quality of 
information present in aesthetic objects and hence 
facilitate their objective and scientific judgment 
(Klütsch, 2012, p. 67). Information aesthetics was 
originally developed by Max Bense and Abraham 
Moles between 1956 and 1958. These two 
researchers were very influential figures in the so-
called ‘Stuttgart School’, a group around which many 
digital art pioneers gravitated. Information aesthetics 
reinterpreted concepts such as ‘process’ and 
‘entropy’ as seen by physics and MTC under Peirce’s 
pragmatic semiotics, and merged them with Birkhoff’s 
‘aesthetic measure’ (1933) conceived as a ratio 
between order and complexity – hence, the lower the 
complexity, the higher the order and the aesthetic 
value. Bense, regarded artworks as signs that could 
be broken down into isolated elements (primitives) 
that could then be treated as the building blocks of 
algorithmic processes (Klütsch, 2012). He imagined 
art as a process of aesthetic production, 
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consumption, and criticism whose workings could be 
formalised in terms of an axiomatic system. 
The key assumption information aesthetics made – or 
at least that Bense made – was that creative 
processes generally produce order (Rigau, Feixas & 
Sbert, 2008) or ‘negative entropy’ out of disorder. This 
idea is closely connected to Boltzmann’s identification 
of entropy with disorder (Ben-Naim, 2007, p. 196). 
According to this interpretation, physical processes 
tend to change from initial more ordered states, 
towards a state of maximum entropy or ‘“mix-
upness”’ – as described by the polymath J. W. Gibbs 
(Ben-Naim, 2007, p. 198), a key figure in the 
development of statistical mechanics. Thus, as Bense 
saw it, while the physical world is inevitably poised 
towards chaos (i.e. to a state of maximum entropy), 
aesthetic creation strives towards order or 
‘negentropy’ (see Klütsch, 2012). It is in the relation 
between chaos/complexity and order that aesthetic 
value lies; and for Bense this framework has the 
status of a natural law. The aesthetic object has 
special properties that go beyond its material carriage; 
a ‘correality’ that is determined by ‘macroaesthetic 
rules’ which may be interpreted and modelled through 
objective algorithmic processes. By surrendering 
subjective interpretation, Bense and Moles’s not only 
gave up on aesthetics as ‘a theory of sensual 
perception’ (Nake, 2012) but also on the notion that 
‘the subject matter of aesthetics is in itself intrinsically 
subjective’ (Cohen et al., 2012). 
3 | THE ARTWORK AS AN INTEGRAL INFORMATIONAL 
SYSTEM 
In the last chapter of his (2009) book, Entropy and 
Information, the late Russian biophysicist Mikhail 
Volkenstein offers an informational interpretation of 
aesthetic value. The core premise of his model is that 
creating art involves generating new and irreplaceable 
information. In other words, that artistic creation 
implies ‘the fixing, the committing to memory, of 
random choices’ (Volkenstein, 2009, p. 186). 
Artworks thus may be regarded as non-isolated 
‘integral informational systems’ that not only comprise 
but – most importantly – also further generate new 
information. They are non-isolated because once 
entering the world, artworks acquire a life of their own, 
potentially interacting with an audience while 
maintaining a linkage with their creators. Artworks are 
integral systems because – as happens with living 
organisms – all their features are indispensable for 
proper functioning, and even the slightest change in 
their internal structure can potentially alter their whole 
meaning. That is why a single word in a poem can 
potentially downgrade a masterpiece to tackiness. 
3.1 CREATING NEW AESTHETIC INFORMATION 
Because every artwork is open for interpretation, 
every person is entitled to say whether they like it or 
not. Nonetheless, a competent and serious judgment 
calls for the observer to have a ‘thesaurus’ 
(Volkenstein, 2009, p. 188), that is, certain 
background knowledge, aesthetic sensibility, and 
willingness to interpret the artistic information being 
conveyed. That is why the receptor effectively plays 
the role of co-creator of the piece. Furthermore, 
reception of artistic information involves both a partial 
loss as well as an ‘enhancement’ of information, just 
like every instance of communication is potentially 
subjected to the interference of noise [3], originated in 
the physical and environmental conditions 
surrounding the transmission. Given the 
unsurmountable gap between the mind of the artist 
and the minds of her audience, a certain amount of 
information conveyed by her artwork is bound to 
dissipate in the process of being received. For 
Volkenstein (2009, p. 187) such loss is ‘inevitable’ and 
‘trivial’. What is not trivial is the fact that the artwork 
‘activates or programs [emphasis added] a stream of 
associations, thoughts, and feelings in the 
consciousness of the receptor’ (Volkenstein, 2009, p. 
188) stimulating the creation of new information by 
him or her. In summary, according to Volkenstein, the 
true value of an artwork resides not in the object itself 
but in what it brings about in the audience engaging 
with it. 
3.2 THE VALUE OF ARTISTIC INFORMATION 
For Volkenstein, the value of the information 
generated by an artwork depends largely but not 
exclusively on its singularity and irreplaceability. The 
more novel and unexpected the information a given 
artwork generates – i.e. the less redundant it is – the 
more valuable it will be. But regarding this point 
Volkenstein (2009, p. 188) notes an important caveat: 
whereas for MTC redundancy is normally equated to 
low informativeness, in the context of art the 
equivalency cannot stand, since many artworks use 
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repetition precisely as an aesthetic device. Therefore, 
a truly redundant and uninformative artwork will be so 
on the basis of cliché and banality, or because it 
merely stands out due to technical prowess. 
Volkenstein thus generalises: the value of a work of art 
may be seen as directly proportional to the novelty 
and unexpectedness of the information it conveys. 
Nevertheless, however indispensable newness might 
be, it is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
artistic value. This is illustrated by the fact that a given 
artwork might simply be a derivative and or mediocre 
exemplar of an already established genre, thus it 
cannot generate valuable information beyond its own 
‘matter of factness’. A true artwork needs to not only 
convey, but also stimulate the production of new 
information. 
Volkenstein is aware that aesthetic judgements do not 
happen in a vacuum, but that artworks are interpreted 
according to fluctuating tastes and socio-cultural 
norms. Reception of artistic information is both a 
collective and a personal matter subjected to historical 
and psychological changes. That is why yesterday’s 
mediocrity may become today’s masterpiece and vice 
versa. The timeless masterpiece is thus the artwork to 
which we ’return’ repeatedly over the course of our 
lives and that always seems to offer something new; 
true ‘genius’, as Volkenstein (2009, p. 190) argues, ‘is 
unlimited informativity’.  
Volkenstein describes art as a process that creates 
order out of a primeval chaos, but also as a peculiar 
form of knowledge of the world. He sees entropy as 
directly opposed but also indispensable for the 
emergence of art; since it is precisely a lack of 
uniformity which allows the poietic ‘negative entropy’ 
to emerge and be noticed. Contrary to more fatalistic 
interpretations of entropy, Volkenstein sees this 
phenomenon as an imperative condition for life since 
without it there would be no movement, no 
transference, and no change. 
4 | BEYOND INFORMATION AS A QUANTITY 
4.1 INFORMATION AS SEMANTIC CONTENT 
The very reason MTC is such an effective tool for 
information technologies (namely, its disregard for 
semantic content) makes it comparatively limited 
within the humanities. Quantitative models neglect 
granular detail and individual cases because operating 
at a higher level of abstraction allows them to explain 
phenomena in more general terms. Science, after all, 
is about compressing the largest amount of 
information about any given phenomena into the 
shortest and simplest explanation [4]. In the context of 
art, however, the assumption is that every artwork 
represents a unique irreplaceable instance, even 
though it may share some qualities (physical or 
otherwise) with other exemplars of its class. When we 
approach works of art, we do it with a hermeneutical 
intent attuned to granular detail. Hence, the question 
is what benefits does it have to talk about art in terms 
of information when the very formulation of this 
concept seems to ignore its most crucial aspects? – 
namely, semantic content and its reception. Luckily, 
as Shannon (1980) himself recognised, MTC’s 
reductive characterisation of information is by no 
means the only one available. 
4.2 THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF INFORMATION 
Most fields related to information science now tend to 
agree upon an operational definition of information 
based on semantic content (Floridi, 2011b). According 
to this ‘General Definition of Information’ (GDI) 
semantic contents may be considered information if, 
and only if they are composed of ‘well-formed 
meaningful data’ [5] (see Floridi, 2004; Floridi 2011b). 
Along with rejecting the possibility of data-less 
information, GDI requires data to have some form of 
representation (e.g. binary digits) and also – given the 
nature of current computational technology – physical 
implementation [6]. Now, regarding the question of 
how or why data can carry meaning in the first place 
is, according to Floridi (2004), one of the most difficult 
problems for semantics and human cognition in 
general. Nonetheless, it is possible to bypass this 
problem by assuming the issue ‘is not how but 
whether data constituting information as semantic 
content can be meaningful independently of an 
informee’ (Floridi, 2004, p. 45). Examples such as the 
Rosetta Stone [7] and the growth rings in tree trunks 
show the answer is that meaning is not – at least not 
exclusively – in the mind of the human subject (Floridi, 
2004). 
4.3 TWO TYPES OF SEMANTIC INFORMATION 
Understood as semantic content, information comes 
in two major flavours: instructional and factual. 
Instructional information – also known as ‘imperative’ 
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information – is the kind one might find in stipulations, 
orders, recipes or algorithms. These instances have a 
semantic dimension, since they have to be 
interpretable and therefore meaningful, but unlike 
instances of factual information, they cannot be 
correctly qualified in terms of falsehood or truth, only 
perhaps as being correct or incorrect [8]. Instructional 
information does not convey specific facts nor does it 
model, describe or represent ideas; it merely helps to 
‘bring about’ (Floridi, 2016) (factual) information. For 
its part, factual information (also known as 
‘declarative’ information) is the most important of the 
two kinds of semantic content, but it is also the most 
common way in which information in the capacity of 
information ‘can be said’ (Floridi, 2004). Factual 
information ‘tells the informee [agent] something 
about something else’ (Floridi, 2004, p. 45); for 
example, the location of a place, the time of the day, 
an idea, a fact, etc. To borrow a metaphor from Floridi 
(2004), factual information is like the ‘capital’ or centre 
of the ‘informational archipelagos’, since it provides 
both a clear commonsensical grasp of what 
information is, while linking all other concepts related 
to information. 
5 | DISCUSSION 
5.1 TWO INFORMATIONAL MODELS 
Volkenstein, like Birkhoff, saw order and complexity as 
oppositional terms, but drew a diametrically distinct 
interpretation out of their relationship. For Birkhoff, 
orderliness meant intelligibility, which translated into a 
better grasp of the intrinsic aesthetic structure and 
value of the artwork by the audience. By the same 
token, complexity obscured order and diminished 
intelligibility. For his part, Volkenstein understood 
complexity as a matter of encoding. Following 
Kolmogorov, Chaitin, and Martin-Löf, Volkenstein saw 
complexity as the size of the smallest program 
needed to describe every one of the features of a 
given object (Volkenstein, 2009, p. 182). The more 
complex the object, the more complex the description 
it requires, and therefore the higher the amount of 
information present in it. Conversely, the more 
structured or ordered – and hence knowable and 
expected – an object is, the lower its complexity and 
informational size. It follows that under this definition – 
and in accordance with MTC – maximum complexity 
is equivalent to maximum randomness. However, 
Volkenstein notes two important caveats: (a) from a 
descriptive or taxonomic standpoint, complexity is not 
a fixed quality, but something relative to one’s level of 
observation; and (b) due to Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem, there is no logical way to prove 
mathematically that a given program/description of an 
object is in fact the minimal one. 
To illustrate the relativity of complexity, we can – as 
Volkenstein (2009, p. 82) suggests – think of the way 
a biologist and a butcher regard a bull’s brain: while 
the former sees a complex system whose minimal 
detailed specification might require a few millions of 
bits, the latter sees but one of the couple dozen 
edible parts of the animal. Similarly, while the word 
‘cat’ would take up some twenty-four bits, a picture of 
a cat might need a few thousand bits, and a (high 
definition) video of the same cat up to a few million 
bytes. It follows that, for the time being, encoding the 
complete specification of that particular cat – or any 
other organism – in a program shorter than the actual 
specimen (Volkenstein, 2009, p. 183) is unlikely, to 
say the least; otherwise, we would be living inside a 
Borgesian fantasy. Hence, it is safe to say that at least 
in the former sense every organism in our known 
world is irreplaceable. 
This conception of irreplaceability also applies to 
artificial objects and, in particular, to works of art. 
Though it is possible to manipulate and even duplicate 
certain kinds of artworks, as Volkenstein (2009, p. 
183) argues, it is impossible to devise a minimal 
program for something like Anna Karenina without 
affecting its overall integrity. Abridging an artwork is by 
definition a reduction of its informational content and, 
according to Volkenstein, of its aesthetic integrity and 
value. Complexity is a matter of structure while 
irreplaceability, seen in terms of informational value, 
has to do with added functionality (see Volkenstein, 
2009, p. 184). To our photographically sensible eyes, 
a hyperrealistic painting may be structurally almost as 
complex in terms of informational size as the ‘real-life’ 
scene it has encoded, but in truth it contains little new 
information beyond the factuality of its own existence. 
For Volkenstein, this type of mimetic art does not say 
something new and unexpected about something 
else (its referent), but merely displays the technical skill 
of its maker. Under Volkenstein’s framework, it is the 
fact that we learn and do something else with 
whatever we grasp from an artwork – i.e. that we 
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‘create new information’ – that truly determines its 
artistic value. It is not orderliness and recognised 
formal patterns that are aesthetically pleasing, but the 
delight of acquiring new, unexpected, and useful 
knowledge about something in the world. 
Volkenstein describes artworks structurally as 
complex integral informational systems, but 
functionally as programs that, upon being read, trigger 
the generation of information that did not previously 
exist within them. This metaphor allows us to imagine 
our relation with art in a more contemporary manner. 
We may describe the artwork as a ‘bootstrap loader’ 
that launches our ‘thesaurus’, thereby allowing us to 
generate ideas and connections that we could not 
have conceived otherwise. We may also think of an 
artwork not as a pre-compiled program, but more like 
a complex ‘script’ that may be run through a myriad 
of interpreters and produce an equally different 
number of outputs. These could include value 
judgements ranging from a total lack of interest to 
considering the artwork a true masterpiece. 
Nonetheless, like all metaphors, this one also has 
limits. Unlike computers, our interpreting abilities are 
not limited to performing numerical calculations and 
remembering their results; we humans establish 
complex semantic associations without even trying. 
As interpreters, we not always consciously ‘choose’ 
which information present in the artwork we pay 
attention to and which we ignore. Our interpretations 
are shaped by our mental and emotional states, by 
our intellectual and personal backgrounds, and by the 
very historical and cultural circumstances surrounding 
our engagement with these and other objects and 
agents in the world. 
5.2 COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
Regarding artworks structurally as complex systems 
clarifies why purely quantitative and supposedly 
objective measures of aesthetic value are unlikely to 
succeed, at least for the time being. Complex systems 
are ‘all about information’ (Taleb, 2012), they arise 
whenever a given set of autonomous entities – 
henceforth ’observables’ [9] (Floridi, 2011a) – 
interacting with each other ‘display emergent 
collective properties’ (see Mignonneau & Sommerer, 
2006); and if said properties change over time the 
system is dynamical (Mainzer, 2004). Because they 
are filled with intricate interdependencies which most 
of the time are difficult even to identify, complex 
systems tend to evolve in non-linear fashions; i.e. they 
might change in truly unpredictable ways (Taleb, 
2012). Since the properties of the system are the 
result of the mutual interaction of its components, a 
complex system cannot be analysed by focusing on 
isolated observables, or even on some of the causal 
relationships already known to exist between them. 
Furthermore, the isolated ‘behaviour’ of a system’s 
element might not even reflect back on the general 
ensemble. Complex systems call for a somewhat 
‘ecological thinking’ (Taleb, 2012) since even the 
slightest change or disturbance can potentially alter 
the equilibrium of the entire ensemble. That is why, as 
Volkenstein argued, complex systems are 
(necessarily) integral. 
Like complexity itself, specified observables are 
always relative and dependent upon the level of 
analysis employed to analyse them. Being the source 
of information about the system, observables are 
chosen based on the outlook, presumptions, 
theoretical framework, goals and desired granularity of 
the observer. Thus, choosing a given observable 
implies making an ontological commitment – i.e. 
accepting its existence – which, in turn, is supported 
by a larger network of beliefs, knowledge, practices, 
intentions, and instruments (technologies) influencing 
the experience of the observer. This is why the same 
system may be analysed and described through 
different approaches that may or may not share the 
same observables or even the same definition of a 
particular observable – and for that matter, of the 
system as a whole. Hence, observables are not 
universally ‘objective’, some of them may be 
subjective or at least far more dependent on the 
theoretical approach than the observer would like to 
admit. Such is the case with the notions of complexity 
and ‘order’ used by Birkhoff and information 
aesthetics. 
Order is a relational as well as a multifactorial 
phenomenon; it does not (cannot) exist in isolation nor 
it is a universal value. Patterns, on the contrary, are far 
more common, pervasive and easier to formalise. As 
noted earlier, information aesthetics sees art as 
something that creates order or ‘negative entropy’ 
and, by the same token, sees entropy, and 
randomness as equivalent to disorder. Bense’s 
understanding of the second law of thermodynamics 
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aligns with nineteenth century interpretations of 
entropy as a force ushering the world towards a state 
of chaos, uncertainty and dissipation of energy. Along 
with being pessimistic and subjective, this 
interpretation is outright misleading. A far more useful 
way to regard entropy is simply as the tendency of 
systems to assume their most probable configuration 
(see Ben-Naim, 2007); whether such state 
corresponds to ‘disorder’ is a qualitative but not 
quantitative judgement. This interpretation elucidates 
why maximum randomness implies maximum 
informativeness (the absence of a clear-cut pattern 
allows many other patterns to emerge and for more 
information to be chosen), and shows why art is not 
antithetical to entropy. Just as life could not exist 
without motion (Volkenstein, 2009, p. 169) – without 
the transference of energy, chemicals, etc. – patterns 
cannot exist without chaos and randomness. In short, 
entropy and ‘negative entropy’ (i.e., patterns, 
structures, art) are opposite but complementary 
phenomena. 
Aesthetic objects are never engaged in vacuo, they 
are, to put it in Volkenstein’s terms, always judged 
against a more or less apt ‘thesaurus’. Art is the 
product of a socio-cultural ‘judgement’ (Nake, 2012, 
p. 74), artworks have no magical intrinsic qualities, 
they are objects that display and convey an intentional 
pattern that generates information. Genres, styles, 
movements, formal qualities, they are all 
epistemological constructs deeply entrenched in 
culture. Art is relational; it arises from the interaction 
between the object-pattern, the audience, and the 
context. The value of an artwork depends as much on 
the way it is in-formed by its creator as on the way it is 
interpreted and judged by the audience. Without 
risking exaggeration, this relational process involves a 
myriad of variables, from perceived technical prowess 
of the artist to the viewer’s own knowledge and 
mental state. 
It follows that a true measure of aesthetic value should 
not only account for all the structural elements present 
in any given artwork and for their mutual interactions, 
but also for all the potential contexts and thesauruses 
involved in its interpretation. This of course presumes 
that somebody has found a way to break down an 
artwork into objective minimal units and also figured 
out the rules governing how they are structured and 
interpreted by a human being. Given the intricacy of 
both tasks, it is safe to say that attempting to 
objectively quantify every single one of these variables 
remains an unfeasible task. 
5.3 BEYOND ANALOGUE VS DIGITAL 
Granting that artworks are informational systems also 
shows the ‘analogue vs digital’ dichotomy is an 
epistemic rather than ontological construction. The 
difference between analogue and digital is one of 
encoding; they are both levels of abstraction but with 
different granularities, they are specifications. Humans 
experience aesthetic artefacts through the same 
sensory apparatus despite their purported ontological 
status; our brains process the information in them just 
the same. The artwork exists as an object because 
we impose a level of observation on it, but at the most 
elemental level what we are always dealing with is 
information. At a fundamental level, information is 
indistinguishable and therefore interchangeable, there 
is no essential difference between one unit and the 
next one, what we identify as the object-artwork is in 
truth a stable pattern, the sum and arrangement of a 
given number of units of information. From this 
epistemological standpoint there is no necessary 
ontological distinction between analogue and digital 
objects. Consequently, this type of informational 
approach is equally useful for traditional aesthetic 
artefacts as it is for their digital counterparts. 
Volkenstein shows us that the artwork is ‘telling’ us 
something we did not know, conveying factual 
information, describing something, a certain view of 
the world; in so doing something changes, something 
gets triggered in another system: the viewer’s mind. 
The work of art as a system is open and in flux. 
Information begets information, it is something alive, a 
pattern that is to be constructed. The rarity, the 
unexpectedness of the potential information 
generated is what begets value. The artwork is a 
pretext in the amplest sense of the word; a program 
with uncertain and unlimited outputs. Birkhoff and the 
creators of informational aesthetics understood 
beauty and aesthetic value as something inherent and 
immutable within the object, while Volkenstein shifts 
the value to intuition, to the knowledge that falls 
outside logical proof. For Birkhoff and for informational 
aesthetics, artistic value is to be discovered and 
explained, for Volkenstein, it is to be constructed and 
reimagined. The uniqueness of an artwork is the 
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unquantifiable result of an interaction between minds 
and of every potential interpretation that can come out 
of that type of engagement. 
Volkenstein’s two key points: that (a) artworks may be 
regarded as complex systems, and (b) artistic value 
has to do with novelty and irreplaceability but, most of 
all, with (unlimited) informativeness, represents a 
valuable contribution to art scholarship. Volkenstein’s 
model does not enter into contradiction with other 
interpretations of aesthetic value but complements 
them; it does not force us to see or to understand 
artworks just as information, but to see them as 
different configurations, as types of encoding. 
Unlimited informativeness is unlimited interpretability, 
which in turn depends on the individual and its 
context. Each time we run the artwork-program 
through an interpreter we obtain a new iteration of a 
program, which in turn may lead to other programs 
and variations. 
6 | CONCLUSIONS 
Regarding artworks as complex systems which, at the 
very least, ‘say something about something else’ does 
not alone explain how or what type of information a 
given artwork might convey; nor does it solve all 
problems presented by aesthetic experience. What it 
does show is that any quantitative model attempting 
to describe aesthetic value is dealing with a complex 
system whose dynamics cannot be reduced to its 
individual components. Artworks are not magical 
objects; regarding them as informational systems 
places them along other complex human processes. 
Demystifying art helps us define what it is without the 
aura of mystery. Art is a very complex (one of the 
most complex) deliberate forms of communication. 
Seeing it as information helps to understand it as a 
communication phenomenon and hence, instead of 
devaluing or reducing it, it helps explaining it. 
What has been offered in this paper is not an outright 
negation of the possibility of artworks being analysed 
through quantitative means, but simply an explanation 
of why it is so difficult to do so. Like all complex 
problems, recognising the obstacles goes a long way 
towards finding apt solutions – however modest – 
and, in the process, learning more about our 
methodologies. Seeing artworks through an 
informational perspective can bridge the gap with 
computational interpretations, which in turn may also 
work as metaphors that could promote cross-
fertilisation between programming and art. Finally, we 
have seen the concept of information is by no means 
limited to Shannon’s quantitative characterisation, but 
instead represents a powerful hermeneutical device 
even in the context of the humanities and the arts. 
Moreover, it is now clear that an informational 
characterisation of artworks does not necessarily 
reduce aesthetic experience to a mindless 
computational process. Quite the contrary, this type 
of approach helps to elucidate precisely why art is 
intrinsically open, mutable and rich. 
ENDNOTES 
[1] The following year (1949) Shannon republished his 
work as a book co-authored with mathematician 
Warren Weaver, under the title ‘The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication’. 
[2] As Floridi (2004) argues, using this name 
interchangeably for MTC is misleading, since the latter 
is a theory of information without meaning, albeit not 
in the sense of being meaningless, but rather in the 
sense of not yet being meaningful. Therefore, a more 
suitable name would be ‘theory of data 
communication’. 
[3] That is, ‘unwanted data’ (Floridi, 2016) received 
along with a message and with the potential to 
impede its adequate apprehension. 
[4] Richard Feynman’s often cited explanation of the 
value the atomic theory would have in the aftermath of 
an apocalyptic event that obliterated all human 
knowledge is a good example of this notion (see 
Gleick, 2011a). 
[5] The definition of ‘data’ is itself contentious. Data is 
the Latin translation of the Greek word, dedomena; it 
is the utmost unit to which information may be 
reduced. In its singular form, ‘datum’, is a fact 
concerning some difference or lack of uniformity 
within some context, e.g. the perceptible difference 
between two letters in the alphabet, or the difference 
between the presence or absence of an object (see 
Floridi, 2004, 2011b). That is why information is 
sometimes characterised as ‘a difference that makes 
a difference’ (see Byfield, 2008). 
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[6] It is important to note, however, that physicality 
does not necessarily entail materiality (see Floridi, 
2010). 
[7] Prior to its discovery, Egyptian hieroglyphics were 
indecipherable; the discovery of the stone provided an 
‘interface’ to access their meaning; this however did 
not affect their original semantics (see Floridi, 2004). 
[8] Consider for example a musical score or a piece of 
software, neither of them may be successfully 
qualified in alethic (truth or falsehood) terms. 
[9] It is important to note that observable is not the 
same as ‘empirically perceivable’; since both a system 
and its components may be entirely abstract objects 
(see Floridi, 2011b). 
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